Gender and Meat: Making the Connection

‘So the cultural myth of the hamburger is buttressed by masculinity and affirms, in turn, the recurring connection between meat and masculinity.' – Reeser
  

‘The word vegetable acts as a synonym for women’s passivity because women are supposedly like plants.’ – Adams

‘According to the mythology of patriarchal culture, meat promotes strength; the attributes of masculinity are achieved through eating these masculine foods.’ – Adams

‘Forbidding meat to women in non-technological cultures increases its prestige.’ – Adams

Meat eating is a very personal topic to me and hence writing on this topic requires a lot of self-restraint; I've therefore decided to touch on a few key issues surrounding gender and meat. The connection between diet and gender without any ethnographic or qualitative research yields some interesting trends: in all societies, even where meat consumption is low, men consume more meat than women and more women are vegetarians. Behind this then, a gender analysis would consider the way in which there is a connection between meat and constructs of gender. As Adam in 'The Sexual Politics of Meat' posits, vegetables become associated with women and passivity; forbidding meat to women increases its prestige as a masculine food that promotes strength. This is important since Hutchings argues that masculinity is based upon a hierarchical logic of exclusion and associated with degradation of the feminine. If animals are included in this hierarchy, they would be placed at the bottom as the most feminine, the most passive in this structure. Their degradation is the most extreme in form in that they are commodified to the extent that they become non-entities, reflected a) in the way that language transforms them from beings (pig) to objects/commodities (bacon) and; b) in the way in which the vast majority of animal protein we consume is feminine (eggs, milk, beef).

It is important to consider the way in which masculinity is not always tied to men. Where masculinity appears at the top of this hierarchy, all values, practices and customs associated with it become desirable and therefore those who are feminised within this hierarchy (for example, lower-castes/classes could be considered feminised/emasculated relative to upper-caste/class groups) seek to emulate and attain such a status; it must not be assumed that they agree with such an exclusionary and oppressive structure, rather it may be seen that this is the model that society is predicated upon and that they are working within this structure to increase their status. It then may be seen that the increase in meat consumption world wide, particularly in countries like India where upper-caste Brahmins have often been vegetarian, is the result of transnational, globalised masculinities and the way in which people seek to emulate them. The increase in meat consumption can not only be connected to the masculine nature of capitalism and how it cares only for the quantitative (and therefore commodification and profit), but also the way in which society at the local level becomes masculinised and even women adopt these 'masculine' traits in order to improve their status/position within this heirarchy. The problem of using this methodology points to some larger issues that will not be discussed in detail here, but simply: it is important to consider the extent to which using this structure, which requires degradation in order to maintain and reproduce itself, creates greater polarisation and oppression of those at the bottom, squeezing them further and creating greater polarisation within this heirarchy.

Ethical vegetarian/vegan movements in the west present a challenge to the hegemonic connection between meat and masculinity. There are several vegan sportsmen such as strongman Patrik Baboumian, Boxer Mike Tyson, Noel vegan fitness star which attempt to subvert the notion that meat is connected to masculinity. It is then pertinent to note the sensationalist reports that claim that vegetarianism (which is perceived to be a soy-heavy diet in the west) 'turns children gay'. As discussed in previous posts, heterosexuality is the pinnacle of hegemonic masculinity, and thus associating homosexuality with a food that is perceived to be a staple of vegetarian diets implies that 'meat is not masculine'. The attempts by vegan male sport stars then is interesting: it uses various forms of hegemonic masculinity such as physical strength (which is associated with meat) to masculinise vegetarian/vegan-ism and to some extent feminise meat-eating through slogans like 'real men don't eat animals'. The problem here is that rather than rejecting the notion of masculinity all together, they wish to retain the concept and reinvent it in a vegan form. Since masculinity is a real construct in society, the attempt to challenge its definitions and reinvent in this it may serve to subvert the way in which hegemonic masculinity can facilitate violence and risk taking behaviour. However this does not address other forms of subordination that the structure may encourage, and therefore it is pertinent to consider the way in which this approach serves simply to improve conditions for those lower in the structure without addressing the structure that leads to such degradation in the first place.

‘People with power have always eaten meat… Dietary habits proclaim class distinctions, but they proclaim patriarchal distinctions as well. Women, second-class citizens, are more likely to eat what are considered to be second-class foods in a patriarchal culture: vegetables, fruits, and grains rather than meat.’ – Adams

Globalised Homosexual Identities: The Pros and Cons of Uncompromised Homosexuality

Within academic debates regarding subalternity and homosexuality there are two broad arguments: a) ‘modern’ homosexual identities are the product of ‘gay imperialism’ from the ‘west’ and therefore unsuitable for non-western climates; and b) ‘modern’ homosexual identities are rooted in a rights-based initiative for legal and cultural change. Yet both arguments are simplistic and require greater nuance for LGBT equality worldwide.

The search for (and proof of) a native homosexual identity is important for the most conservative elements of a subaltern society that may reject homosexuality on the basis that it is foreign to their culture and society. The ‘modern’ homosexual identity that has developed is somewhat problematic for these cultures where it is viewed as the only definition of homosexuality, but so are the ‘native' definitions that appear in academic debate. Hijras in India can be divided into kothi and panthi: the former takes the passive position in intercourse where the latter takes the active position and marries a female. The kothi will dress and behave as a female and live among other kothis, and those kothis that castrate themselves refer to themselves as ‘asli’ (authentic), and the un-castrated as ‘nakli’ (fake/inauthentic). While there is a case to be argued that this represents a greater tolerance in Indian society (historically) towards homosexuality, this should not be the form of homosexuality that is upheld in Indian society in the search of a native homosexual identity. It is rooted in compromise, it reduces homosexual relationships to sexual transactions and puts kothis, panthis and their wives at risk; it is predicated on the imitation of heterosexuality via the aforementioned binaries; it denies the right, particularly to kothis, of a stable loving relationship. This is particularly interesting as it seems that the more feminine of the kothi-panthi relationship has more to loose: they are not able to fulfil notions of hegemonic masculinity and be accepted as a part of wider society by hiding their sexuality and having a married life. Perhaps most importantly, this native form of homosexuality is silent on female homosexuality: implying that females should not, or do not deserve the right to sexuality.

Conversely, the example of Polari, a subdialect used in Britain by predominantly by gay men before the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Europe reveals the way in which a subculture and a native gay identity existed in Europe. It can thus be understood that with greater legal rights and social recognition as an acceptable orientation, native homosexual identities erode with the development of LGBT rights and equality on the basis of individualism and freedom. Conversely, the LGBT rights movement and this ‘modern’ globalised homosexual identity is rooted in rejection of compromise, and while geographically ‘western’ in origin, is not a ‘western’ gay cultural identity.

The context of this globalised homosexual identity is then problematic, not because it seeks to achieve parity with heterosexuality socially, but because it is rooted in the concept of individualism. In Indian society which is collective rather than individualistic, an uncompromised homosexual identity is somewhat problematic where heterosexuals often have to compromise on relationships regularly: marriage to someone within the same caste and religious group is likely to be expected, and a pre-marital boyfriend/girlfriend may not be a suitable marriage partner. Any analysis of gay liberation in India and the search for equality and parity both socially and legally must not be predicated on the rhetoric of individual liberty and rights alone. This is not to imply that India is not worthy of these concepts, but to deny the collective nature of many subaltern cultures is to do great damage to the search for LGBT liberation in those societies.

There is a risk then that the wealthiest in those societies are able to adopt this ‘globalised’ homosexual identity where they have little economic dependence on their families and do not have to worry about destitution if they are rejected and disowned. This leaves the poorest in society alienated from the LGBT rights movement and serves to fragment and dichotomise the LGBT community from within on class (and caste) lines: moving forward thus means the careful navigation between the ‘no-compromise’ principle and the nature of a collective society which expects compromise.

The Masculinisation of Jainism in India: Hinsa Paramo Dharma?

Those familiar with Indian religions will know the famous statement ‘ahinsa paramo dharma’ (the highest religion/duty is non-violence) is usually connected with Jainism, a small religion originating in the 5^th century BCE. Jains are less than 0.5% of India, but boast the highest literacy rates, the highest number of working females compared to all other religious groups, and contribute towards 25% of India’s GDP.

Ahinsa (non-violence, as opposed to hinsa, violence) in practice requires vegetarianism with the additional exclusion of egg, root vegetables (to avoid harm to bugs when removing from the ground), sweeping the ground by monks/nuns to avoid harming life and wearing a face covering to avoid breathing in organisms.

Jainism is far from a gender equal religion. It places restrictions on women’s movement in religious spaces during their menses, while the Digambara sect believes they must be reincarnated as a male before in order to obtain moksha (liberation). The doctrine of ahinsa strictly forbids abortion and all types of physical/emotional violence which may seem to be hugely in favour of the development of girls and women, especially when it comes to the issue of female foeticide in India. Yet after Sikhs, Jains have the second highest sex-ratio imbalance. The economic success of the Jains cannot be divorced from this, and ideological masculinity is an important unit of analysis. Sikhs are also one of the wealthiest religious groups in India. Trajectories that consider economic success as of primary importance in advancement and development are masculine in nature: it relies on the quantitative binary. This is in contrast to the principle of ahinsa which is qualitative and therefore feminine: focused on caring and emotions. While India is famous for its high vegetarian population and cuisine, the reality is that even in India as a whole, more women are vegetarian than men, reflective of world-wide gendered patterns of vegetarianism. It is therefore to consider the extent to which the increasing sex-ratio imbalance, violence and ideological masculinity are interrelated, with the Jains being a microcosm of trends developing in wider Indian society. If a religious community such as Jainism is not able to maintain a balanced gender ratio with economic success then what does this say about India's development as a whole?

It is the masculine emphasis on capitalism and a quantitative approach to improving livelihood that leads to the masculinisation of such communities. The Svetambara sect of Jainism has around 4 nuns to every 1 monk, revealing the way in which women are generally more committed to this most essential principle of Jainism. The decline of Jainism’s influence can be seen in India as a whole: its leather industry recorded a cumulative annual growth rate of about 8.22% in 2011-12 and enjoys an annual turnover of $7.5 billion, non-vegetarianism is on the rise as incomes increase.

Jains are somewhat unique in their practice of sex-selection when compared to other communities. Where others detect the sex of a foetus after conception, Jains practice pre-conception sex selection, seemingly allowing them to adhere to the feminine principle of ahinsa by avoiding abortion. It is simplistic to consider the other gender inequalities in Jainism as a factor contributing to the practice; Sikhism is practically the most gender equal religion in the world, yet this has not influenced Sikhs being the group with the worst sex-ratios in India. Ideological masculinity remains at the heart of such issues, whether it is the affect on economics and the state, or at the local level. It is therefore pertinent to consider whether there has been as masculinisation of the doctrine of ahinsa in Jainism – focusing on abortion (rather than pre-conception sex-selection) as a form of hinsa (violence) involves a simplistic, quantitative approach to the doctrine in theory in practice. It does not consider the interrelatedness of all beings and the impact of pre-conception sex-selection on society, which could contribute towards greater creation of hinsa as a whole. It does not consider how this causes problems for men of a lower economic standing, who are unable find a wife, possibly causing social and emotional problems through being unable to act out the greatest requirement of hegemonic masculinity: heterosexual marriage (since where women are fewer in number they may choose wealthier spouses, placing considerable pressure on men); it does not consider how the practice leads to trafficking of women for marriage and prostitution, placing them in great danger and situations of vulnerability.

Finally, it is essential to draw in the masculine nature of capitalism as an ideology which focuses on the quantitative and how this facilitates (hyper-)masculinisation of wider society. This leads to the reduction of ideologies like ahinsa that may be considered feminine, and the effect this has on gender relations at the local level must be considered. In this in the Indian context this has clearly allowed female infanticide to take on a new form of female foeticide and exacerbate it as a practice by making it quantitative and clinical: one might argue that the rise in access to such technologies makes it easier people to exterminate a girl child, since drowning a girl child in milk after birth requires physical (and emotional) interaction with a child before the murder. Acknowledging this should not be divorced from the hyper-masculinsation of dowries which girl children a greater burden where capitalism creates greater demand for goods, thus producing quantitative increases in dowry demands.